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I.  Abstract 
National roaming is a measure that can be agreed commercially between operators to 
extend coverage or can be imposed or facilitated by governments as a means to 
increase competition amongst networks. It has been used with varying degrees of 
success in a range of countries, notably in the European Union. It has generally faced 
resistance from established operators, reluctant to assist prospective competitors and 
reduce their shares of the market. In some countries implementation has been so 
poor as to fail in the objectives. The absence of agreed procedures and performance 
indicators may have contributed to some of those failures. The costs of deploying 
third generation networks are causing some operators to look at more extensive 
agreements, sharing radio access networks, rather than national roaming. A further 
factor has been the lack of prospective entrants in mature markets, making national 
roaming less important than had been expected.  ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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II.  Introduction 
While attention has focused, arguably disproportionately, on policies to bring down 
the persistently high prices of International Mobile Roaming (IMR) there are also 
issues concerning National Roaming (NR). In addition to any benefits that come from 
identifying global best practice in NR, there may also be lessons to be transferred to 
IMR. The two look very much alike and might well pass the “duck test”, with the 
differences being that with the IMR customers can see that they are roaming on their 
handsets and should know that they have to pay a significant premium, especially 
within the European Union (EU).1 
A variety of technological, economic and political arguments in the 1980s and 1990s 
fatally undermined traditional positions in favour of a natural monopoly with 
governmental provision of mobile telecommunications. However, inertia has been 
seen in implementation of liberalisation, as a result of national decision-making 
structures and their interplay with private interest groups.2 While regulators possess 
an informational advantage, they sometimes collude with industry incumbents, 
especially where they are financed by those operators, slowing liberalization. The 
ideologies of governments have a significant influence on outcomes, depending on 
the extent to which they have favoured liberalisation. Some countries experienced 
rapid progress, while others took several years. The question here is how these forces 
played out on the introduction and implementation of NR. 
In a few geographically more extensive countries  notably China, India, Russia and 
the USA  licences for mobile services were issued on a local or regional basis. As a 
first step towards offering a national service, local or regional operators entered into 
mutual arrangements for roaming, sometimes aided by regulation, in their respective 
service areas. The operators responded by pursuing economies of scale up to the 
national level by acquisitions and by taking up additional geographic licences in 
subsequent auctions and beauty contests. Elsewhere, such economies of scale have 
generally been a matter of international expansion and consolidation.  
This paper first addresses access to emergency call numbers by means of NR. It then 
examines the development of policies in the EU under successive regulatory 
frameworks. Then a series of country case studies are described and analysed: 
United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Finland, Cyprus, Turkey and New Zealand (NZ). 
The economic incentives of the various players are then considered. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn and issues identified for further research. 
III.  National roaming as an instrument of policy 
NR has been seen as an instrument of public policy, used primarily to facilitate 
market entry, in order to reduce concentration and to increase competition. It allows 
a new entrant a period of time during which it can offer a national service without 
having completed construction of its own national network. In the issuing of new 
licences it is considered a vital precondition to ensure non-discriminatory treatment 
of new entrants. If NR is allowed to endure then it gives rise to competition concerns.  
                                                       
1 The “Duck Test” is formulated as: “It is a duck if it walks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks 
like a duck.” There is a history of its origins at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duck_test  
However, this fails to make the obvious link to the 1843 story of The ugly duckling by Hans Christian 
Andersen. 
2 Tomaso Duso & Jo Seldeslachts (2010) “The political economy of mobile telecommunications 
liberalization: Evidence from the OECD countries” Journal of Comparative Economics 38 (2) 199-216. ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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A closely related policy concerns the sharing of passive infrastructure, such as sites 
and towers, essential for the provision of mobile services. Analysis by competition 
authorities has shown these to present fewer dangers for competition than the 
sharing of Radio Access Networks (RANs), which generally gives rise to serious 
concerns about anti-competitive effects. 
An analysis of the incentives in the construction of 3G networks has shown that, in 
equilibrium, full national coverage is achieved by means of competitors enter sharing 
and roaming agreements, but causing higher retail prices to consumers.3 Against a 
background objective of ensuring the greatest possible coverage, targets were set for 
percentages of the population able to use the 3G networks. It is possible to reduce the 
incentives for operators to use NR and RAN sharing by decreasing the scope for 
appropriation of extra-rents which they could otherwise have enjoyed. They can be 
eliminated by disallowing any sharing or, alternatively, NR fees can be regulated. 
NR for 3G networks can provide significant benefits for customers.4  
Another related area is the introduction of Mobile Virtual Network Operators 
(MVNOs) that, in effect, engage in permanent national roaming (see Figure 1).5 The 
policy objective here is long-term service-based competition. This is in contrast to the 
infrastructure-based competition facilitated by NR, which would be expected to 
deliver more disruptive changes. 
Figure 1  Mobile operator value chain possibilities6 
 
Note: A Mobile Virtual Network Enabler (MVNE) provides services to MVNOs, such as billing, network element 
provisioning, administration, operations, support of base station subsystems and operations support systems, and 
provision of back end network elements. 
 
Governments have a range of possible instruments available to increase competition 
in oligopolistic markets for mobile telecommunications including NR and MVNO 
obligations. However, they face strong pressures from the operators seeking to 
consolidate their activities through mergers or sharing RANs.  
                                                       
3 Simona Fabrizi & Bruno Wertlen (2008) “Roaming in the mobile Internet” Telecommunications Policy 32 
(1) 50-61. 
4 Johan Hultell & Klas Johansson (2007) An estimation of the achievable user throughput with national 
roaming. Stockholm: KTH. http://tinyurl.com/5wmyogd 
5 Aniruddha Banerjee and Christian M. Dippon (2009) “Voluntary relationships among mobile network 
operators and mobile virtual network operators: An economic explanation” 
Information Economics and Policy 21 (1) pp 72-84. 
6 Timo Smura, Annukka Kiiski & Heikki Hämmäinen (2007) “Virtual operators in the mobile industry: a 
techno-economic analysis” Netnomics 8 (1-2) 25-48. 
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IV.  Emergency services 
An important public policy objective is to ensure the greatest likelihood of 
connecting calls to the telephone numbers of the emergency services, even at 
locations where the network to which an individual subscribes does not provide a 
service. Such calls, always provided they are genuine, should be facilitated and given 
priority.  
Access to emergency services, using the pan-European number 112, is available in 
almost all EU member states where a customer’s network has no coverage (see Table 
1).  In twenty-one EU countries handsets that do not have a SIM-card can be used to 
make calls to the emergency services, with the exception of Belgium, France, 
Romania, Slovenia, the UK, Germany (ceased June 2009) and Bulgaria (ceased July 
2009). 
Table 1   Non-availability of 112 on other domestic mobile networks 7, 8, 9 
Country  Status as at January 2009  Status as at January 2010  Status as at January 2011 
Slovakia  -  -  Only O2 users on T-Mobile 
Belgium  Two MNOs, but not the 
third 
Two MNOs, but not the 
third 
- 
Estonia   SIM card has first to be 
removed  
SIM card has first to be 
removed 
- 
UK  No – discussions underway  Available since October 
2009 
- 
Cyprus  Activated during 2008  -  - 
Romania  Activated during 2008  -  - 
       
In March 2009 the UK regulator, the Office of Communications (OFCOM), launched 
a consultation on the mandatory provision of automatic national roaming between 
the five mobile operators for calls to the emergency services.10 This was intended to 
address the problem that some calls could not be connected because the customer’s 
network was not available. It was a particular concern in remote areas, notably in 
parts of Scotland and Wales. The service had been available until the mid-1990s 
when it had been shut down, in response to concerns by the emergency authorities 
about the large number of hoax and nuisance calls. OFCOM argued that re-activating 
the service would improve public safety.  
Following a successful trial, a service was again operational in October 2009.11 Users 
could call the emergency services on either 112 or 999, the traditional UK emergency 
number, from another network if their own network was not available. A national 
roaming solution had been rejected as likely to be expensive for operators and to 
have taken longer to implement. Instead, a Limited Service State (LSS) solution was 
adopted as being both cheaper and faster. Unlike NR, LSS neither provided location 
                                                       
7 EC (2009) Implementation of European emergency number 112 - results of the second data-gathering round 
(January 2009). COCOM 09-11 and Annex. Brussels: European Commission.  
8 EC (2010) Implementation of European emergency number 112 - results of the third data-gathering round 
(January 2010). COCOM 10-09 and Annex. Brussels: European Commission.  
9 EC (2011) Implementation of European emergency number 112 - results of the fourth data-gathering round 
(January 2011). COCOM 10-38 and Annex. Brussels: European Commission.  
10 OFCOM (2009) Access and inclusion: digital communications for all: Consultation. London: Office of 
Communications. 
11 OFCOM (2009) Access and inclusion: digital communications for all: Statement. London: Office of 
Communications. ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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information nor Calling Line Identification (CLI), meaning that emergency services 
are unable to return the call.12 
Similar limits exist in the United States of America (USA). For example, Verizon 
Wireless warns its customers that in “extremely limited circumstances” a 911 call 
which is outside its own and its NR partners’ coverage will not allow emergency 
services to return a call to such a handset, since there is no access for incoming calls.13  
The US Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 required location 
information (Enhanced-911) to be provided to emergency services.14 The  Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) consulted on the means to extend 911 and E-911 
to IP-enabled voice services, including those provided while roaming on Wi-Fi hot 
spots.15 In its Order it did not require Mobile VoIP providers to provide an E-911 
service, though in a dissenting comment the FCC Chairman argued it should have 
been included. 16  
In December 2010, the FCC Federal Communications Commission opened an inquiry 
into a next generation of emergency services (NG911) to enable the public to obtain 
emergency assistance using advanced communications technologies, beyond 
traditional voice-centric devices.17 
Clearly there is much more work to be done in ensuring access, traceability and the 
ability to return the calls of users of mobile phones and of, increasingly, ad hoc 
network devices such as games consoles, e-book readers, netbooks, tablets and the 
like. The elimination of hoax and nuisance calls remains a significant problem. NR 
plays a valuable role in ensuring access to networks to make calls to the emergency 
services, especially in remoter locations.  
V.  European Union 
The Licensing Directive of 1997 set out the agreed principles with which Member 
States (MSs) had to comply when licensing 3G services. 18 The  UMTS  Decision 
provided additional detail, in particular the requirement to ensure seamless 
compatible communications and coverage across the EU.19 3G was uniformly taken 
to mean UMTS with neither cdma2000 nor TD-SCDMA being seriously considered, 
facilitating both NR and IMR. However, it required dual-mode handsets in order to 
                                                       
12 Hutchison 3G UK Limited (2009) Response to Mostly Mobile: Ofcom’s Mobile Sector Assessment: Second 
consultation. London: Office of Communications. 
13 http://support.vzw.com/faqs/Wireless%20Service/faq_domestic_roaming.html#item6 
14 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.438.IH: 
15 FCC (2008) In the matter of implementation of the NET 911 Improvement Act of 2008. Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking. August 25, 2008. WC Docket No. 08-171.  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-195A1.pdf 
16 FCC (2008) In the matter of implementation of the NET 911 Improvement Act of 2008. Report and 
Order. October 21, 2008. WC Docket No. 08-171.  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-195A1.pdf 
17 FCC (2010) In the matter of framework for next generation 911 deployment. Notice of inquiry. 
December 21, 2010. PS Docket No. 10-255. 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-200A1.pdf 
18 Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common 
framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications 
services.  
19 Decision No 128/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 1998 on the 
co-ordinated introduction of a third-generation mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in 
the Community, OJ L 017, 22. 01.1999, p. 1. ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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access GSM networks. To ensure non-discriminatory treatment of operators without 
a pre-existing network, NR was to be ensured for any new entrants. 
Article 4 (2) of the UMTS Decision permitted MSs to act to ensure coverage of less-
populated areas. By 2001, many MSs had made arrangements for national roaming in 
order to improve or to accelerate coverage (see Table 2).20  Very quickly national 
roaming between 2G and 3G was at least possible and often mandated, subject to 
specific conditions.21 
Table 2   Provisions for national roaming as at March 2001 
Availability  Countries 
Yes  Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain & UK. 
TBD  Denmark, Greece, Ireland & Luxembourg. 
Other  Germany (commercial negotiation) & Sweden (access to GSM spectrum). 
TBD = To be decided 
 
Additionally, some MSs allowed the possibility of 3G to 3G national roaming 
agreements, including Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Spain. The sharing of geographic zones within a country, coupled with national 
roaming, was used to ensure coverage of different parts of the national territory and 
to accelerate full national coverage. Except for Finland and Spain, such arrangements 
did not count towards licence conditions that required coverage of some proportion 
of the territory or population.  
Prior to 2003, most member states had designated at least one of their GSM operators 
as having Significant Market Power (SMP), with eleven of the then fifteen MSs 
having imposed NR obligations, of which five regulated the prices for NR.22 With the 
2002 directives, regulators had to undertake analyses of Market 15 for Mobile Access 
and Call Origination (MACO), to determine which remedies were necessary, 
including NR, which was identified in Art. 12 (1)g of the Access Directive 
(2002/19/EC). Several MSs removed the NR obligations of operators: 
  France; 
  Netherlands; 
  Norway; 
  Spain; and  
  Sweden.  
A fallback position, where no operator had SMP, would have been to impose NR on 
operators using Article 5 of the Access Directive, on the basis that competition was 
not fully effective.23 
In 2007, MACO was removed from the list of markets.24 The explanation offered was 
largely in terms of wholesale access for MVNOs and not NR, with a view that the 
                                                       
20 EC (2001) The introduction of third generation mobile communications in the European Union: State of play 
and the way forward. COM (2001) 141. Brussels: European Commission. 
21 EC (2002) Towards the full roll-out of third generation mobile communications. COM (2002) 301. Brussels: 
European Commission. 
22 ERG (2006) Mobile access and competition effects. ERG (06) 45. Brussels: European Regulators Group. 
23 Tommaso Valletti (2003) Obligations that can be imposed on operators with significant market power under 
the new regulatory framework for electronic communications: Access services to public mobile networks. (Brussels: 
European Commission). 
24 Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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market tended towards competition.25 The entry of new operators was largely over, 
with the exception of a number of unissued licences, notably, in: 
  Belgium; 
  Luxembourg; and  
  France.  
With diminished expectations of market entry, with construction of quite extensive 
national networks with at least some spare capacity, the need for regulated NR has 
greatly diminished.  
VI.  Network sharing 
In February 2002, the European Commission received applications from operators 
proposing to share their 3G networks: 
  Germany: T-Mobile and O2; 26 and  
  United Kingdom: O2 and T-Mobile.27  
This followed the auctions in Germany and the UK in which operators had spent 
enormous sums to acquire individual licences to build dedicated 3G networks. 
Financial markets and governments feared that the construction of the networks 
would be delayed by their high costs and the increasing realisation that the revenues 
might not, at least initially, be proportionate to the expenditure. Quam, a joint 
venture of Telefónica and Sonera, having won a licence to operate 3G services in 
Germany returned it, without the fee being refunded.28 
In 2003, the EC adopted two decisions determining the extent to which the operators 
could cooperate through network sharing and NR, these were in addition to the 
guidelines issued by the respective national regulators. 29 , 30   Site  sharing  was 
considered not to restrict competition. NR was held to restrict competition at the 
wholesale level, with potentially harmful effects in downstream retail markets, 
because of dependence on the price and quality provided by the other operator. The 
EC recognised that NR would allow the operators to provide better coverage and 
quality of service within a shorter time frame. 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services. C(2007) 5406 rev 1. 2007/879/EC. 
25 EC (2007) Staff working document: Accompanying document to the Commission Recommendation on 
Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex 
ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services. SEC(2007) 
1483/2 
26 Case COMP/C-1/38.369 
27 Case COMP/C-1/38.370 
28 The Superior Administrative Court of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia (OVG) in Muenster gave 
its judgement on June 30, 2009 (Ref. 13 A 2969/07), deciding that the UMTS license acquired by Quam 
GmbH in the auction of 2000 had been legally revoked and that the regulator was not obliged to pay 
back the fee of €8.5 billion. 
http://www.bakernet.com/BakerNet/News/Archive/GermanFNAUMTSLicense.htm 
29 2003/570/EC: Commission decision of 30 April 2003 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement Case COMP/ 38.370 —O2 UK Limited / T-Mobile UK 
Limited (‘UK Network Sharing Agreement’). 
30 2004/207/EC: Commission decision of 16 July 2003 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.369: T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany: 
Network Sharing Rahmenvertrag). ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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In negotiation with the EC the operators revised their agreement for Germany, 
creating a complex hierarchy of provisions for NR, undertaking gradually to roll 
back the service, first in major then minor urban areas and finally rural areas. The EC 
then exempted these, for limited periods, under Article 81 (3) EC. 
O2 Germany appealed against these provisions of the Decision, arguing there was no 
intention to restrict competition, nor would this be the effect of the agreement as 
claimed by the EC.31 In 2006, the Court of First Instance (CFI) annulled Articles 2 and 
3(a) of the Decision.32 In addition to procedural failings by the EC, the CFI held that 
NR did not restrict competition within the meaning of the Article 81(1) of the EC 
Treaty (now Article 101(1) TFEU).33 The Court accepted that NR assisted O2, as the 
smallest GSM operator, in entering the UMTS market and this might well increase 
competition. This left in place only the Article 81(3) exemption which restricted 
resale of NR to MVNOs on the grounds that without such a prohibition the MNOs 
would not have entered into the agreement. 
VII.  United Kingdom 
In 1999, OFTEL held a consultation on the provision of NR on existing GSM 
networks for future new entrant UMTS operators.34 It proposed a licence condition 
for the GSM operators to act as a “backstop”, requiring them to provide NR, should 
commercial negotiations fail. This was necessary to ensure a “level playing field” for 
any new entrants. Incumbent operators were in an “excessively powerful 
competitive position” compared to prospective new entrants to the market. Both Her 
Majesty’s Government (HMG) and the Director General of Telecommunications 
regarded it as essential for the success of the auction of 3G licences that customers of 
new entrants be permitted NR. 
One2one, supported by Orange, won a judicial review against OFTEL.35 This struck 
down the requirement that they had to accept NR on their GSM licences as a 
condition of bidding for a 3G licence. OFTEL then had either to persuade the 
operators to accept changes to their GSM licences or it could have referred the matter 
to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). However, both O2 and 
Vodafone agreed to the NR condition. 
The policy for future spectrum assignment had been set out in 1996, paving the way 
for auctions. 36  The 3G auction attracted nine bidders, as against four existing 
                                                       
31 Action brought on 25 September 2003 by O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co. OHG against Commission of the 
European Communities (Case T-328/03) (2003/C 275/88). 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2003:275:0052:0053:EN:PDF 
32 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 2 May 2006 — O2 (Germany) v Commission 
(Case T-328/03) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:154:0015:0015:EN:PDF 
33 T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany [2004] OJ L75/32 (CEC) 
Case T̻328/03, O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co. OHG v Commission of the European Communities. [2006] 
ECR II-1231. 
34 OFTEL (1999) Statement on national roaming. London: Office of Telecommunications.  
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/1999/consumer/roam1099.htm 
35 Mercury Personal Communications Ltd & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State For 
Trade & Industry [1999] EWCA Civ 2072 (6 August 1999). 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1999/2072.html 
36 President of the Board of Trade (1996) Spectrum management: into the 21st Century. London: HMSO. Cm 
3252. ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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operators, a significant factor in the large sum of money it raised.37 Had only four 
licences had been offered, it was believed the four incumbents would have used their 
competitive advantages to outbid and thus exclude potential new entrants. Therefore, 
a key element was the provision of NR to facilitate new entrants. Nonetheless, the 
four incumbents won 3G licences. They were joined by Hutchison Whampoa, trading 
as “3” (3UK), which successfully negotiated an NR contract with O2. 
In May 2003, looking to the implementation of the new EU regulatory framework, 
OFTEL again consulted on NR. 38  Licences  were  to  be  replaced  with  general 
authorisations under the new directives, but could be supplemented by continuation 
notices.39 OFTEL decided to continue the NR obligation, despite objections. The new 
entrant was already claiming to cover 60-65 per cent of the population and Vodafone 
argued that the GSM operators were likely to have spare capacity in rural areas 
making a competitive outcome for NR likely in the ‘last square miles’.40 
In July 2004 OFCOM began a further consultation on NR. 41  It  proposed  to 
discontinue Condition 69A of the licences of Vodafone and O2, which provided for 
NR on their 2G networks for 3. OFCOM now argued that it was no longer 
proportionate or objectively justified on the basis of access. 
Nonetheless, OFCOM maintained a commitment to ensure that 3 had a “high degree 
of certainty” about the availability and the terms for NR, though it sought less 
intrusive means to achieve this goal. 3UK had a commercial agreement with O2 and 
at least one other operator had committed to negotiating an alternative, on a 
commercial basis. OFCOM observed that it retained its statutory dispute resolution 
powers, though it did not set out how it might handle such a dispute. 
At the request of 3, OFCOM postponed its decision until its own tendering exercise 
was completed. In 2006, 3 signed a contract with Orange for NR outside the 88 per 
cent coverage it had built.42 
Consequently, licence condition 69A requiring the provision of national roaming 
remained in force. 
In March 2010, the EC approved the merger of two major mobile networks in the UK, 
those of Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile) and France Telecom (Orange), which became 
Everything Everywhere Limited.43, 44 This was despite the joint venture becoming the 
market leader, with 29.5 million customers. The aim of the merger was to pool 
                                                       
37 National Audit Office (2001) The auction of radio spectrum for the third generation of mobile telephones. 
London: The Stationery Office. HC 233 Session 2001-2002. 
38 OFTEL (2003) National roaming condition: A consultation on proposals to set a national roaming condition 
after 25 July 2003. London: Office of Telecommunications. 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/eu_directives/2003/eu_roam/roam0503.pdf 
39 Schedule 18 of the Communications Act 2003. 
40 Responses to consultation are available at: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/responses/2003/roam0503/index.htm 
41 OFCOM (2004) National roaming: A further consultation. London: Office of Communications. 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/roaming/nr_update 
42 3G Operator 3 and Orange hook up for national roaming, 10th May 2006. 
http://www.3g.co.uk/PR/May2006/3040.htm 
43 Merger of T-Mobile UK and Orange UK cleared by EU [sic] Commission. Everything Everywhere, 
press release, 1 March 2010. 
http://everythingeverywhere.com/2010/03/01/merger-of-t-mobile-uk-and-orange-uk-cleared-by-eu-commission/ 
44 Mergers: Commission approves proposed merger between UK subsidiaries of France Telecom and 
Deutsche Telekom, subject to conditions. European Commission. IP/10/208. 1 March 2010. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/208 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_5650 ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
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resources to create a better high-speed mobile broadband network, with synergies 
from both firms, having combined 2009 revenues of £7.6 billion and EBITDA of £1.4 
billion. The T-Mobile and Orange UK brands were to continue separate operations 
for at least 18 months after the completion of the transaction (i.e., until mid-2012). 
The EC initially held serious doubts about the merger. Its analysis showed customers 
switching operators in ways that showed the parties were not particularly close 
competitors. The UK market for retail mobile services was considered competitive 
and likely to remain so following the merger. 
The spectrum available was divided amongst the five operators, with O2 and 
Vodafone having 900 MHz spectrum and all five having both 1900 and 2100 MHz 
spectrum (see Table 3). There was concern that the combination of the spectrum 
holdings of Orange and T-Mobile would allow the merged entity to launch a unique 
national 2x20MHz LTE network in the near future at speeds of up to 100 Mbps.  
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom undertook to divest 2×15 MHz of their 1800 
MHz GSM frequencies. Of the divested spectrum 2×10 MHz was to be cleared by 30 
September 2013 and the remaining 2×5 MHz by 30 September 2015.  
Table 3 United Kingdom spectrum allocations to mobile network operators (MHz) 
Operator  900  1800  2100   Total  
Orange  -  2x30  2x10  2x40 
T-Mobile  -  2x30  2x10  2x40  
Combined   -  2x60  2x20  2x80  
Vodafone  2x17.4  2x5.8  2x15  2x38.2  
O2  2x17.4  2x5.8  2x10  2x33.2  
3UK  -  -  2x15   2x15 
Total   2x35  2x72  2x60  2x167 
         
3UK had agreements with both merging parties dating from 2007: 
  A 3G RAN sharing agreement with T-Mobile; and  
  A 2G NR agreement with Orange. 
Under the RAN agreement 3UK and T-Mobile merged their 3G networks to create a 
unified network of 13,000 sites under a joint venture. This allowed 3UK significantly 
to increase its coverage in the UK and to diminish its use of the 2G agreement. The 
FT/DTAG joint venture would have created the incentive to terminate or to 
compromise the 3G RAN agreement. To eliminate this, the merging parties 
undertook to modify the agreement with 3UK to change the provisions for its 
termination, to safeguard 3UK when consolidating the Orange and T-Mobile 
networks and to submit written reports to the monitoring trustee on continuing 
negotiations with 3UK. 
In February 2010, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) requested the EC refer to it the 
consideration of the merger, under Article 9(2)(a) of the EU Merger Regulation, 
arguing that it threatened significantly to affect competition in UK mobile 
communications markets. In light of the commitments offered by the parties, the OFT 
withdrew its referral request on 1 March 2010. 
The issue was further complicated by introduction of spectrum trading in June 
2011.45 This included all three bands ‒ 900 MHz, 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz ‒ aimed at 
giving operators added flexibility. 
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For all the enthusiasm of the UK to ensure an opportunity for the entry of new 
players, this was eventually whittled down to one and that required several 
interventions to sustain its rights to NR. Ultimately, the UK has seen a reduction in 
the number of competing RANs, with considerable collaboration and consolidation 
between players, faced with the costs of covering a relatively densely populated 
country. The outcome of any spectrum trading, the sale of spectrum by Everything 
Everywhere and the 2012 auctions for LTE spectrum (800 MHz band) will show how 
much infrastructure competition there will be, certainly much less than envisaged in 
preparation for the 3G spectrum auction. 
VIII.  Ireland 
The third GSM licence in Ireland was awarded in June 1999 to Meteor, but was not 
issued until mid-2000, due to litigation initiated by Orange, the loser in the beauty 
contest.46 In 2005 Meteor was acquired from Western Wireless Corporation (USA) for 
€420 million, by Eircom, formerly Telecom Éireann. The state-owned operator had 
been privatised and then acquired by private equity “investors”. Eircell, its original 
GSM operation had been first spun-off and then acquired by Vodafone, leaving it a 
purely fixed network operator. 
The government issued 3G licences were to “3 Ireland” (Hutchison Whampoa Ltd), 
Vodafone and 02 (Telefónica de España). The fourth licence was issued in late 2005 to 
Smart, which beat both Eircom and Meteor in the contest.47 In February 2006, the 
regulator cancelled the licence following the failure of Smart to make the payments 
specified in its bid and in the licence conditions. This decision was upheld on appeal 
by the Dublin High Court in March 2006.48  The licence was then offered to and 
accepted by Eircom, completing the set of four GSM and UMTS players.49  
Meteor had belatedly launched its GSM service in early 2001, making slow progress 
against the two established operators. In February 2003, it announced it had sought 
assistance from the regulator in its pursuit of an NR agreement.50 Meteor  finally 
obtained an NR agreement with O2, signed in August 2004. 
In its market analysis in 2005 the regulator found O2 and Vodafone to be jointly 
dominant, which they maintained by a “constructive refusal” to grant wholesale 
access for airtime service providers or MVNOs.51 The regulator accepted that the NR 
agreement with O2 allowed Meteor to compete more effectively, but argued there 
was no evidence at that time that the NR agreement was sufficient to alter the 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2011/06/20/mobile-spectrum-trading-given-go-ahead/ 
46 Orange Telecommunications Ltd. v. Director of Telecommunications Regulation [2000] IESC 22 (18th 
May, 2000). 
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2000/22.html 
Orange Telecommunications Ltd. v. Director of Telecommunications Regulation (No.2) IESC 22; [2000] 
IESC 79; [2000] 4 IR 159 (18th May, 2000). 
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2000/79.html 
47 “Irish regulator awards final 3G License” Cellular News, 16th November 2005. 
http://www.cellular-news.com/story/14860.php 
48 Smart Mobile Ltd v Commission For Communications Regulation [2006] IEHC 82 (13 March 2006) 
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2006/H82.html 
49 James Middleton “Eircom accepts 3G licence” Telecoms.com, 28 February 2007. 
http://www.telecoms.com/7500/eircom-accepts-3g-licence/ 
50 “Meteor seeks national roaming from ComReg” Silcon Republic, 6 February 2003. 
http://www.siliconrepublic.com/digital-life/item/609-meteor-seeks-national-roami 
51 Comreg (2005) Market analysis – Wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephony  
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dynamics of the market. It limited NR agreements until the access seeker had has its 
own network covering 20 per cent of the population. The joint dominance decision 
was subsequently withdrawn. The test for joint dominance is relatively high and 
very difficult for a regulatory authority to achieve.52  
In 2005, 3 launched its UMTS service as a new entrant, having signed a GSM NR deal 
with Vodafone. 
Figure 2  Mobile market shares by revenue in the Republic of Ireland53 
 
The result today is a market still dominated by Vodafone and O2, the older 
established operators (see Figure 2). It could take a further decade for 3 Ireland and 
Eircom to reach some level of parity.  
IX.  Finland 
In 1999, in response to a complaint by Telia, then a new entrant on the Finnish 
market, Kilpailuvirasto (the Finnish Competition Authority) accused the two leading 
mobile operators, Sonera and Radiolinja (later rebranded as Elisa), of violations of 
the Competition Act.54 There was alleged to be a price squeeze between the wholesale 
charges for NR and the retail charges for its own customers, which prevented Telia 
from providing a competitive national service.55 This squeeze was intended, in the 
short term, to protect the market positions of Sonera and Radiolinja.  
At that time, neither Sonera nor Radiolinja held, either separately or jointly, a 
dominant position on the market for NR, but both had the opportunity and the 
                                                       
52 Chris Doyle (2007) “Collective Dominance, Market Analysis and the 2002 EU Framework Directive: 
The Case of Mobile Access and Call Origination in Ireland” pp 141-69 in Author: Paul J J Welfens & 
Mathias Weske (editors) Digital economic dynamics. Berlin: Springer. 
53 Comreg (2011) Quarterly key data report: Data as of Q1 2011. Doc. No. 11/44. Dublin: Commission for 
Communications Regulation.  
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incentive to use their market power to affect competitive conditions. Kilpailuvirasto 
closed the case after Telia concluded an NR agreement with Radiolinja in 2000, which 
enabled the former to offer nationwide coverage.56 Nonetheless, Telia appealed to the 
Competition Council against the decision of the Kilpailuvirasto, since it continued to 
seek access to the more extensive network of Sonera. 
The Competition Council confirmed the opinion of the Kilpailuvirasto that Sonera did 
not hold, either alone or jointly with Radiolinja, a dominant position on the market.57 
However, it rejected Kilpailuvirasto’s opinion that the operator was engaged in an 
abuse of dominance, but accepted that its pricing practices had harmed competition. 
The case was sent back to the Kilpailuvirasto to clarify whether the prices for national 
roaming were slowing the entry of competitors. 
In March 2002, the merger was announced of Sonera and Telia. Following the failure 
of the Telia-Telenor merger.58  At that time Sonera was the largest and dominant 
provider of mobile telecommunications in Finland, with more than half the market 
and with very substantial coverage of the population. Telia was the third largest 
network with limited coverage, but extended by NR contracts with both Radiolinja 
and Suomen 2G (Finnet Group), respectively the second and fourth operators. In the 
view of the European Commission the proposed merger raised “serious doubts as to 
its compatibility with the common market in relation to the provision of mobile 
communications services”. 
In July 2002, the EC approved the merger.59 TeliaSonera had undertaken to divest the 
Telia network in Finland and to be non-discriminatory in its provision of wholesale 
mobile network services in Sweden and Finland. The merger resulted in savings for 
TeliaSonera in NR charges.60 The Telia Finland network was  acquired by Song in 
2001, then in 2004 Song was acquired by TDC of Denmark. In 2006 TDC became an 
MVNO on Finnet’s DNA network (900, 1800 and 2100 MHz), in parallel with MVNO 
deals in Norway and Sweden.61, 62  
Elisa (previously Radiolinja) bought Saunalahti in mid-2005, with the Kilpailuvirasto 
requiring commitments only on the fixed market.63 While this decreased competition 
in mobile services it was held not to lead to the creation of a dominant position. 
Following the adoption of the new regulatory framework, Ficora, the Finnish NRA, 
undertook an analysis of the MACO market.64 TeliaSonera had 45 per cent, Elisa just 
under 30 per cent and DNA under 15 per cent, the remaining 10 per cent being held 
by independent service providers. Ficora, supported by the other operators, 
considered TeliaSonera to be dominant, but the EC disagreed, arguing that the 
                                                       
56 TeliaSonera Annual Report 2000, page 9. 
57 Finland (2001) Annual report on competition policy developments in Finland. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/9/2489023.pdf 
58 Stefan Schmid & Andrea Daniel (2009) “Telia - a Swedish-Finnish marriage after a failed Norwegian 
courtship” Thunderbird International Business Review 51 (3) pp 297-310. 
59 DG Competition Case No COMP/M.2803 – Telia/Sonera. 
60 TeliaSonera Annual Report 2003. 
61 Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriö (2005) MVNO pricing structures in Finland. Helsinki: Ministry of 
Transport and Communications. 
http://www.mintc.fi/fileserver/mvno%20pricing%20structures%20in%20finland.pdf 
62 Annukka Kiiski, Heikki Hämmäinen (2004) Mobile virtual network operator strategies: Case Finland. ITS 
15th Biennial conference. Berlin, Germany. 
http://www.netlab.tkk.fi/tutkimus/lead/leaddocs/KiiskiHammainen_MVNO.pdf 
63 http://www.kilpailuvirasto.fi/cgi-bin/english.cgi?luku=publications&sivu=oecdreport2005 
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market was competitive and that TeliaSonera should not be subject to remedies. On 
reconsideration Ficora accepted the position of the EC. 
Kilpailuvirasto began, on its own initiative, an investigation into the wholesale mobile 
markets for access and termination in 2005.  
Today, the Finnish market has two substantial operators, TeliaSonera and Elisa, with 
DNA the other significant player in addition to a sprinkling of small MVNOs and 
service providers (see Figure 3). The degree of concentration is relatively high, even 
allowing for the small size of the market. It seems likely that, with more aggressive 
regulation to support new entrants, especially in the provision of NR, the market 
might have been able to sustain four infrastructure-based competitors. 
Figure 3  Market shares in Finland65  
 
 
X.  Cyprus 
The Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) was the monopoly direct state 
provider of telecommunications for decades, eventually losing its regulatory function 
to the Office of the Commissioner of Telecommunications and Postal Regulation 
(OCECPR), remaining the incumbent state-owned operator. In 2003, a second GSM 
licence was belatedly issued to Areeba (later MTN), though even today the market is 
dominated by CYTA, now Cytamobile Vodafone. 66  It was only in 2009 that the 
second operator, having made remarkably slow progress, could be seen to have 
become properly established (see Figure 4).  
                                                       
65 Ficora (2010) FICORA market review 3/2010: Bi-annual review 2010. Helsinki: Ficora. 
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Figure 4  Market shares in the Cyprus mobile market67 
 
Areeba began its commercial operations in September 2004, signing a national 
roaming agreement with CYTA. On 18 April 2005 it filed a complaint against CYTA, 
alleging a margin squeeze between the wholesale prices it was charged and the new 
retail rates that CYTA had introduced for its own customers. 
The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) found a prima facie 
infringement of Section 6 of the Protection of Competition Law. 68 It  issued  a 
Statement of Objections against CYTA and required it to appear to respond, then 
issued a relatively lenient fine of CYP 50,000.69 The CPC subsequently fined CYTA 
CYP 2,200,000 (€3.8 million) for abusive conduct in the mobile telephony market.70 
This was raised partly because CYTA had failed to comply with an interim order 
issued the previous July which had already resulted in criminal charges against 
CYTA.71 The Cyprus Supreme Court annulled, on procedural grounds, the decision 
of the CPC.72  
                                                       
67 OCECPR (2009) Telecom bulletin. 
68 Protection of Competition Law No. 207 of 1989. 
http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/98B5C3B0F0543CECC22571A80030F50
3/$file/L.%20207-89eng..pdf?OpenElement 
69 See CPC press release of 15 September 2005: 
http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/362CBC9C76D8676FC225707D0027A09
8?OpenDocument 
70 Statement of objections for the infringements of competition legislation by the Cyprus 
Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) following the complaint submitted by Areeba Ltd. Case 
2006/01/20. 





72 [in Greek] Commission for the Protection of Competition (Epitropi Prostasias Antagonismou), 20 
January 2006, Areeba Ltd. vs. Cyprus Telecommunications Authority 













Jun-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 Dec-10
MTN
CYTAITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
 
16 
CYTA was separately found guilty of a price squeeze against a fixed ISP.73 
In parallel the OCECPR had been addressing the problem of NR, noting that: 
According to the Order regarding National Roaming (564/2003), the 
Commissioner took all necessary measures to ensure the continuance of the 
implementation of the relevant provisions and the cooperation between CYTA 
and Areeba, the two mobile telephony providers in the Republic of Cyprus, by 
issuing the Decision 15/2006 in order to settle the dispute of National Roaming 
tariffs. The said dispute arose from a failure to reach an agreement between 
the parties for the amendment and the re-determination of National Roaming 
maximum tariffs, as these were imposed to the parties according to the 
Decision of the Commissioner 5/2004 and were included in the relevant 
National Roaming Agreement they have both signed. The need to amend the 
existing Agreement was a result of the alteration of retail tariffs in mobile 
telephone services by CYTA. 
Cyprus was one of the few countries in the EU where the MACO market was found 
not to be competitive.74 Consequently CYTA was designated as having SMP. The EC 
noted that OCECPR had to ensure competition between the two MNOs through 
“stringent” wholesale regulation, proposing that it impose price controls on national 
roaming. OCECPR determined the price should be €0.0214 per minute for voice calls, 
which MTN alleged was twice the level of cost orientation.  
The “market” in Cyprus has been very poorly governed by the ministry, regulator 
and the competition authority, with little regard for the citizens. The state-owned 
entity has been allowed an entirely unnecessary and enduring dominance, 
presumably also benefitting from its dominance of the market for wholesale IMR 
services.75  The second operator has grown only very slowly because of poorly 
designed and ill-executed policies. As yet no third or fourth licence has been issued, 
nor are there any MVNOs. Some defence is offered with the argument that the small 
size of the market constrains many of the options of larger countries and even 
excludes some.76 
XI.  Turkey 
Experience in Turkey is of an “interesting interplay” between privatization, 
liberalization and regulation.77, 78 It has been complicated by the troubled relationship 
                                                                                                                                                        
0020FD90/ $f ile/AreebaCytaolgakarkastnonconfidentialFINA?OpenElement 
See also the press release in English: 
http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/297CEFF6CC8941D3C22570FF00451B6
C?OpenDocument 
73 Decision of the Commission for the Protection of Competition relating to a proceeding under section 6 
of the Law 207/89 (Case No.: 11.17.25/2004). 
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74 EC (2007) European Electronic communications regulation and markets 2006 (12th implementation report) 
SEC(2007) 403. Brussels: European Commission. 
75 Additionally, CYTA has seen it revenues bolstered by its dominance of the IMR market. 
76 Pavlos C. Symeou (2009) “Does smallness affect the liberalisation of telecommunications? The case of 
Cyprus” Telecommunications Policy 33 (3-4) 215-29. 
77 Izak Atiyas & Pinar Doğan (2010) “Glass half empty? Politics and institutions in the liberalization of 
the fixed line telecommunications industry in Turkey” pp. 261-284 in Understanding the process of 
economic change in Turkey Edited by T. Çetin & F. Yilmaz, Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
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between the Competition Board and the Telecommunications Authority, 
compounded by Council of State being unwilling or unable to resolve matters and by 
periodic political interference.79, 80, 81 Nominally, it has aspired to implement the EU 
acquis communitaire, though implementation has been somewhat selective. 
The first GSM services in Turkey were launched in 1994 by Telsim and Turkcell 
using the 900 MHz band.82 Aria (a joint venture of Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM) and Iş 
Bankasi) entered the market in 2001 Q1 and Aycell (wholly owned by Turk Telecom, 
the fixed incumbent) in 2001 Q4, both using the 1800 MHz band, which requires 
many more base stations. In 2003, Aria agreed to merge with Aycell, later rebranding 
as Avea. Then, at the end of 2005, Vodafone acquired Telsim. In April 2009, after 
previous abortive attempts, 3G licences were issued to the three incumbents, with 
Turkcell taking the largest allocation of spectrum. 
The retail mobile market has been consistently dominated by Turkcell and remains 
heavily concentrated.83 Later entrants fought an uphill battle, failing to make much 
progress against Turkcell, which continued to report figures twice as high as its 
nearest rival for perceptions of network coverage in consumer surveys.84 Using 
revenue data, the HHI is slightly higher than on the chart, because of the success of 
Turkcell in securing post-paid customers (see Figure 5). The failure of the Turkish 
authorities to implement mobile number portability and NR greatly dampened the 
effect of market opening. Based on this, there was only a modest expectation that 3G 
services, admittedly now supported by number portability, would see significant 
changes in the market structure. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
79 Şahin Ardıyok and Fuat Oğuz (2010) “Competition law and regulation in the Turkish 
telecommunications industry: Friends or foes?” Telecommunications Policy 34 (4) 233-43. 
80 Necmiddin Bagdadioglu & Murat Cetinkaya (2010) “Sequencing in telecommunications reform: A 
review of the Turkish case” Telecommunications Policy 34 (11) 726-35.  
81 Şahin Ardıyoka & Fuat Oğuz (2010) “Competition law and regulation in the Turkish 
telecommunications industry: Friends or foes?” Telecommunications Policy 34 (4) 233-43. 
82 TeliaSonera owned 37.3% of Turkcell, raised to 64.3%. Wireless Federation, 8 July 2009. 
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Figure 5  Growth of mobile telephony in Turkey 
 
One study has examined elasticities at firm level, for pre-paid and post-paid 
customers in Turkey, for the period 2002 to 2006. 85  Another  takes  a 
managerial/marketing view of Turkcell and its “early mover” advantage.86 This 
found Turkcell, has used an array of differentiation marketing strategies and 
improved quality of services to defend itself against later entrants. 
NR has been an unresolved dispute since 2001, despite legislative provisions and 
regulatory interventions.87  Aria and Aycel were initially unable to conclude NR 
agreements with Turkcell and Telsim. The obstacle was the high level of charges 
proposed by the two 900 MHz operators, with the clear intention of hindering their 
entry on the market. In November 2001 the two entrants requested the regulator to 
intervene to determine the terms, conditions and prices. However, its decision on the 
concession was subject to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce.  
In 2002, the Telecommunications Authority (TA) adopted an ordinance on NR, which 
specified that:88  
  The TA had 15 days to decide if a request was to be accepted;  
  The parties were expected to reach agreement within four weeks;  
  If they failed to agree, the TA could decide; and  
  The TA could fine operators between 1% and 3% of turnover for failure to 
implement its orders. 
In 2003 the Competition Board imposed record fines on Turkcell and Telsim, 
amounting to €17.8 million, for their abuse of dominant positions by their refusal to 
provide national roaming.89  
                                                       
85 Mehmet Karacuka, Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff (2011) “Competition in Turkish mobile 
telecommunications markets: Price elasticities and network substitution” Telecommunications Policy 35 (2) 
202-10. 
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The two established operators had reached 90 per cent coverage of the population at 
that time, while Aria and Aycell lacked sufficient coverage to compete effectively. 
The entrants faced geographical and topographical difficulties, legal restrictions, 
bottlenecks and technological limitations. Consequently, they could not engage new 
customers and obtain returns on their investments.  
The Competition Board designated the networks of Turkcell and Telsim as essential 
facilities, until sufficient coverage was achieved by the two market entrants. It also 
determined that prices for NR must be related to costs, otherwise it would have 
artificially raised the costs of the new entrants and created a barrier to entry.  
The Competition Board imposed fines on Turkcell and Telsim of 1% of their net sales 
in 2001, for abuse of their dominant positions by refusing to comply with their 
obligation to make NR agreements with Aria. The fine of nearly YTL 30 trillions 
(€17.8 millions) was the highest imposed until then by the Board. 
The Board did not impose a behavioural remedy, based on its expectations of further 
changes in the market conditions and the changes that had already occurred in the 
demand by the new entrants for NR during the investigation. It referred the matter to 
the Telecommunications Authority which it believed had better market information.  
The Council of State, the supreme administrative court in Turkey, stopped the 
implementation of the decision of the Competition Board.90 It was argued that the 
Board’s decision would now have little effect and that NR had ceased to be an issue, 
given the merger of Aria and Aycell.91 However, the merger was substantially the 
result of the failure of government and its agencies to ensure suitable conditions for 
market entry. 
In 2003, the EC noted that no NR agreements had been signed.92 By 2007, there were 
still no NR agreements, though Turkcell and Telsim had been required by the TA to 
satisfy reasonable, economically proportionate, and technically feasible requests 
made by other operators. In 2009, it was again observed that no NR agreements had 
been signed.93 Nonetheless, another provision had been made that allowed national 
roaming to be imposed by the TA, as part of the access obligations in Article 15 of 
Electronic Communications Law.94  
Despite all the legislation, regulatory interventions, litigation and arbitration no 
operator has ever obtained NR services in Turkey. The dominant operator, Turkcell, 
with the most geographically extensive network and the largest customer base, 
continues to attract a disproportionate number of customers because of the extent of 
its coverage and density of its network. The authorities have been shown to be 
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entirely incapable of ensuring reasonable conditions for market entry and even of 
recognising the scale of the problem. 
XII.  New Zealand 
In 2007, the Commerce Commission noted that New Zealand had, after fifteen years 
of duopoly, two relatively evenly matched operators in Telecom NZ and Vodafone, a 
position that remains little changed today (see Figure 6). A belated new entrant, 2 
degrees, has argued that the position is significantly worse, with social and 
geographical monopolies held by each of the operators, propped up by price 
differentials between on-net and off-net calls. By mid-2010 the market shares were: 
Vodafone 50 per cent, Telecom NZ 42 per cent and 2degrees with 8 per cent. 
Figure 6  Market shares of mobile operators in New Zealand 95 
 
The duopolists each used a different technology, Telecom NZ had chosen CDMA 
while Vodafone had GSM, though both are migrating to UMTS for 3G to take 
advantage of opportunities for IMR. Telecom NZ launched its XT Mobile Network 
service, using UMTS in the 850 MHz band in 2009, just as Vodafone was completing 
construction of its UMTS network in the 900 MHz band.96 This meant that customers 
could switch operator by changing a SIM-card, provided they had a quad-band 
handset,97 rather than having to change the handsets as in the past. 
While a third licence had been issued in 2001 to NZ Communications, a consortium 
of Econet of Zimbabwe and indigenous Maori interests, it had repeatedly delayed the 
launch of a commercial service. The company was restructured and rebranded as 
2degrees, finally launching a service in August 2009.98  
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In order to succeed in the market, which was already saturated, 2degrees argued 
strongly that it required NR at reasonable rates. NZ Communications having chosen 
GSM, negotiated an NR deal with Vodafone, completed at the end of 2007.99 It had a 
fallback position, since its licence gave it the right to NR once it had completed 
coverage of ten per cent of the population with its own network.  
The Commerce Commission conducted an inquiry into NR and published its report 
in March 2008.100  In May, the Minister agreed to amend the terms for NR, but 
reserved a decision on whether it should be subject to price regulation.101 This was 
given effect by an Order in Council the following August.102 
In September 2008, having receiving a further request from 2degrees, the Minister 
asked the Commerce Commission to conduct an investigation to consider changing 
national roaming from a specified to a designated service, i.e., to impose price 
controls. The Commission delayed its inquiry while it completed its complex 
investigation into the cost of Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs).103 On 15 December 
2010, the Commission announced that it would not investigate whether NR 
regulation should be extended to prices, because there were adequate commercial 
arrangements in place. 
The need for market entry to help reduce the high level of concentration is self-
evident in New Zealand. The third entrant repeatedly put off its entry, perhaps for 
financial or commercial reasons, yet the authorities did not revoke the licence and re-
auction. When what was effectively a new company did enter, there were repeated 
disputes over NR rates and terms, this made more difficult an already hard entry 
into a saturated and heavily concentrated market. 
XIII.  Economic incentives 
A national network with the most extensive coverage is perceived by many 
customers as an important factor when selecting between competing offers, with 
attention being given to maps and to perceptions of quality and availability as 
reported by friends and colleagues or, more formally, by surveys.104 The absence of 
coverage has led one regulator to use the term “not spot” for areas lacking a 3G or, 
sometimes, a 2G service.105  
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A similar argument applies to the IMR service, with operators offering their post-
paid customers coverage in small islands in the Pacific and on Caribbean cruise liners, 
even on some airlines. There is a clearly a value given to wider geographic coverage 
and also a level of concern amongst operators about complaints of a failure to 
provide the service, with the possible loss of high-spending customers. In IMR a 
foreign operator will have contracts with several and possibly all available networks. 
This is allegedly ensure calls are not lost, but it seems to reflect the significant 
margins available on IMR compared to making similar NR deals.  
Building a truly national network entails a substantial initial investment and not 
insignificant operating costs that depend more on the structure of the network than 
on the volumes of the traffic being carried. For an operator that owns its own 
network, such investments and operating costs are not variable costs and therefore 
have no direct bearing on the price of the units it sells to its customers. The network 
operator has an incentive to achieve the largest economies of scale, within the 
available network capacity, as the costs incurred in building and operating the 
network are largely independent of the units used. Selling large numbers of units to 
an MVNO or to an MNO that is still constructing its own network can be effective 
ways of achieving those economies of scale. As Vodafone noted, networks are 
unlikely to be fully loaded in the “last square miles” and thus inclined to make deals.  
Fewer operators run their own networks today than in the past. Instead they contract 
network management to vendors, which are now as much in the service business as 
in manufacturing. For example: 
  HT Mobile Vietnam to Huawei; 
  Orange UK to Nokia Siemens Networks; 
  Vodafone Turkey to Motorola; and  
  Zain in East Africa to Nokia Siemens Networks. 
Site preparation for masts can be bought from other firms (e.g., Tunk Telecom in 
Turkey). In some cases chains of masts belong to a third party which lease them to 
the operators such as  
  Crown Castle International; 106 
  Indus Towers; 107 and  
  National Grid Transco.108  
One consequence is that many of the costs that are usually considered to be fixed 
may well have become variable. 
Where one operator relies on another operator for a substantial part of its national 
coverage, it can create incentives and constraints in the way in which it sets prices 
and the structure of those prices that are different from those of an infrastructure 
owner. The cost of purchasing wholesale capacity under an NR agreement is 
generally based on the volume of use (the number of minutes of speech, the number 
of text messages and the Megabytes of data). Consequently, use is a variable cost and 
thus contributes, together with other costs, to the minimum price per unit that the 
operator can charge its customers and its ability to offer bundles, “buckets” or 
“unlimited” calls or data.  
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In using national roaming, a mobile operator cannot achieve the same economies of 
scale as on a dedicated network. The more capacity it sells to its customers, the 
higher will be its spending under its NR contract.  
Dependence on a national roaming agreement considerably narrows the room for 
manoeuvre by an operator. Compared with its rivals, a new entrant has quite 
different incentives, for example, in deciding whether or not to adopt an aggressive 
pricing strategy or to attract customers in areas where it does not yet have its own 
infrastructure. 
Vodafone has proposed a model for pricing competitively neutral national 
roaming.109  This takes account of the geographical cost structure of the networks, 
allowing any possible “cream-skimming” effect in which a new entrant concentrates 
the construction its network in lower cost or higher traffic density areas. 
XIV.  Conclusion 
National roaming was seen an important instrument to support the entry of 
additional infrastructure-based mobile network operators that should, in the 
medium term, increase competition and reduce market concentration, delivering 
wider choice, lower prices and better services for consumers and businesses. 
Maximum success requirew it to be offered definitively at the time when licences 
were first announced to attract bidders. The pricing must be sufficiently below retail 
levels as to allow a reasonable degree of flexibility for new entrants when setting 
their tariffs and, at least, a modest profit margin.  
The application of national roaming was predicated on the presence of a pool of well-
funded potential entrants. However, this dried up first in the dot com crash, then as 
markets saturated and the high cost of network construction and customer 
acquisition became clearer. It was not helped by some countries seeking to protect 
smaller national operators from acquisition by multi-national operator groups. 
Instead, multi-national operators switched to growth market: Africa (Orange and 
Vodafone), Latin America (Telefónica) and Asia (Telefónica and Vodafone). Recent 
entrants in markets such as Belgium, France and Ireland have been fixed operators 
driven into mobile more to protect existing revenues with multi-play offers than in 
pursuit of growth.  
National roaming obligations can become disproportionate to policy goals. In 
markets where there is sufficient competition between existing infrastructure owners 
then – at least in theory – existing market players may provide national roaming on 
purely commercial terms. However, those same players have considerable incentives 
not to make market entry easy and to try to thwart, delay or damage the new entrant. 
Thus, even in relatively competitive markets, it seems injudicious to assume 
negotiations will be quick and effective, without the fallback of effective dispute 
resolution by a regulator. 
As the case studies show, inept and delayed implementation or poorly crafted 
decisions being overturned on appeal have damaged market entry, leaving 
entrenched operators in dominant, monopolistic or duopolistic positions, causing 
market entry to fail or to be so drawn-out as to contribute little towards policy goals. 
It is remarkable that, given the clarity of the policy objective, some countries 
managed to fail so abjectly in implementation of national roaming. 
                                                       
109 Jonathan Sandbach (2009) “National roaming pricing in mobile networks” pp 249-64 in B. Preissl et al. 
(eds.), Telecommunication markets, Contributions to Economics. Heidelberg: Springer Verlag. ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND N ATIONAL ROAMING 
 
24 
One of the reasons for the failures has been the absence of criteria for monitoring the 
implementation of NR, with neither the OECD nor the European Commission having 
developed tests or indicators. The measures that might be tracked to diagnose 
possible problems include: 
  Market concentration (calculated both from volumes of use and revenue); 
  Customer numbers (actual, new and churn rates); 
  Average Revenue Per User (ARPU); and  
  Network construction (coverage of area and population).  
The repeated failures to enforce mandated national roaming in Cyprus and Turkey 
illustrate fundamental and systemic flaws. They highlight the risk of markets that 
remain unnecessarily concentrated, in which one operator is allowed to perpetuate 
its dominance and thus draw from the market excessive profits. The causes are 
inadequate systems of governance and the absence of proper reviews of institutional 
performance, including ineffective oversight by the European Commission. Even 
today it is doubtful that the Cypriot and Turkish systems of governance of 
telecommunication markets are fit for purpose, requiring significant institutional 
reforms. 
National roaming does not stand on its own, but is used in conjunction with other 
measures, including mast and network sharing, mobile number portability and the 
supply of leased lines, metro-Ethernet and dark fibre to connect together base 
stations and exchanges. The open licensing of international gateways also helps new 
entrants, by allowing them to offer competitive international call rates, to terminate 
calls and to internalise IMR. 
Much more detail is required to understand which combinations of policies and 
instruments have really been effective and the need for links to other measures. This 
would help regulators fine tune the terms and conditions of national roaming for 
future market entry strategies. Indeed, it may be legitimate to ask if it has ever truly 
worked. 
There is considerable scope for further research. There are questions of the roles of 
outsourcing of network management and the leasing of masts, in order to 
understand how these affect competition in mobile markets. There are also questions 
about the choices between national roaming and the sharing of radio access networks, 
with its need for deeper integration, which may conceal more from regulators, but 
which may yield greater savings for the operators.  
 
 
 